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New Light on the Trial of Billy Budd
Richard H. McAdams* and Jacob I. Corré**

[Draft chapter for forthcoming publication by Oxford University Press on the subject of war in
law and literature, to be edited by Alison LaCroix, Jonathan Masur, Martha Nussbaum, &
Laura Weinrib]
Few American literary works have been the subject of as much academic
commentary as has Billy Budd, Herman Melville’s unfinished final novel.1 Possibly no
American novel has garnered more attention from those interested in the roles that law
plays in understanding literature. To summarize what some regard as a novel immune
to summary: Billy Budd is a guileless and winsome impressed crewman on board an
English man o’ war in 1797. England is at war, and recent mutinies fill the navy with
anxiety. Budd is prone to bouts of severe stuttering. John Claggart, the ship’s master-atarms, brings a malicious charge of mutiny against Budd to Captain Edward Vere.
Overwhelmed by his inability to respond verbally, Budd strikes Claggart and kills him.
Vere seems fond of Budd, believes him innocent of the mutiny charge, and knows he
struck Claggart without malice. Nevertheless, Vere appoints a summary “drumhead”
court to try Budd. After testifying, Vere persuades a reluctant panel of judges to convict
Budd and sentence him to hang. The execution occurs at dawn the next morning, as
Budd proclaims, “God bless Captain Vere!”2
The story raises fundamental questions about the conflict between justice and
military necessity. Budd is a good man who reacted violently but without bad intent to
extreme provocation. Few would think he should die for what he did. The setting on an
English warship in1797 enhances the difficulty of evaluating Budd’s case. England was
at war in 1797.3 Security concerns stood at an exceptionally high pitch. Two significant
mutinies occurred in the ports of England, the first, in April, at the port of Spithead, and
the second, more serious one, in May, at the port of the Nore.4 The events in the novel
occur in the summer of 1797. At several points, the narrator of Billy Budd discusses the
mutinies at the Nore and Spithead and their profound effect on the Navy.
Where did the law stand on Budd’s case? The novel itself offers two sources of
positive law. The first is Vere’s description of the contemporary law governing the
discipline aboard English ships, especially the 1749 Articles of War.5 Some who
condemn Vere have questioned the reliability of his statements of the law. The second
source is the anonymous narrator of the story, who describes the naval customs for a
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drumhead proceeding, and refers specifically to the celebrated 1842 case of the United
States brig USS Somers. The captain of the Somers had summarily tried and executed
three mutineers. A court of inquiry exonerated, and a court-martial subsequently tried
and acquitted the captain and some of the brig’s officers.6 The case was the subject of
public controversy for many years to come.
The earliest law and literature scholarship about Billy Budd drew a parallel to the
events on the Somers and the ensuing legal proceedings.7 This perhaps was the result of
the relation of the Somers case to Melville’s own life. Melville’s first cousin, Guert
Gansevoort, was a first lieutenant on the Somers. Gansevoort helped suppress the
mutiny, and participated in the decision summarily to hang the mutineers.8 The first
extensive analysis of the questions raised by the 1749 Articles of War appeared in 1962,
and found no legal fault in Vere’s actions.9
That scholarship changed dramatically twenty years later. Professor Richard
Weisberg began publishing important work advancing new interpretations of the legal
dimensions of Billy Budd, as well as of Vere’s character.10 Weisberg argues that there
was neither a legal basis for the process of a summary trial for Budd, nor substantive
grounds for executing him. Weisberg combines his legal analysis with a novel
interpretation of the general background of the story and Vere’s actions. He concludes
that Vere deceived the members of the drumhead court into convicting Budd and
sentencing him to die. Vere did this, according to Weisberg, because secretly he
resented Budd, whom he saw as realizing an ideal naval character that Vere knew he
could never obtain.11 Among other supporters of Weisberg’s view that Vere abused the
law,12 Robin West describes the conclusion by saying that Vere is a “murderer.”13
Others disagree with Weisberg.14 In particular, Judge Richard Posner objected to
Weisberg’s analysis of both the applicable law and of Vere’s character.15 In Posner’s
view, Budd was guilty of a capital offense, any irregularities in the trial
notwithstanding. Posner also thinks that Weisberg’s assigning a malicious character
and despicable motives to Vere is an implausible interpretation of the narrative.
We believe there is more to say about these disputes. We examine three types of
evidence: First, as Melville situates Billy Budd in the immediate aftermath of the
mutinies of Spithead and the Nore, collectively known as The Great Mutiny, and the
novel repeatedly refers back to those events, we begin with a historical review of “The
Great Mutiny.” That background provides greater reason to credit the arguments of
Vere, contrary to his critics. Second, while accepting for purposes of argument
Weisberg’s claim that Vere’s statement of the law might be self-serving and suspect, we
examine the relatively neglected statement of the relevant law and customs provided by
2
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the novel’s anonymous narrator. Third, as the novel specifically references the
American Somers case, we examine that affair with an eye towards divining the relevant
naval laws and customs.16
We conclude that the regime of naval discipline, as it existed both in England at
the time of Budd’ s trial, and in the United States around the time of Melville’s
composition, mandated neither Budd’s punishment nor his vindication. Budd’s case
occupies the ground where judgment and discretion combine to determine the
outcome. The circumstances on the Bellipotent, together with the background military
and political circumstances of the time, show even more vividly the intractable
difficulty of deciding Budd’s case. Billy Budd is not a tragic story about the need to cling
to strict law even where intuitions of justice plead for a different outcome. It is not an
outrageous example of the willful manipulation of law by an unaccountable authority
maliciously bent on implementing a grave injustice. It is a story about confronting a
case almost too hard to imagine. Vere may well have been mistaken, but he is not a
murderer.
Billy Budd and the Great Mutiny
Weisberg’s interpretation of Billy Budd emphasizes the personal and
psychological to the detriment of the historical and political. He has little to say about
the context that should play a central role in interpreting Vere’s decisions: the mutinies
of 1797. Melville set his novel in the summer of 1797, right after the series of mutinies at
Spithead and the Nore. Mutinies are normally named after the ships on which they
occur, but these mutinies were named after the ports where they took place because
they occurred in a coordinated fashion on many ships.
The mutinies at Spithead began in early 1797 shortly after a group of seamen
serving on the larger ships of the Channel Fleet sent diverse parties a series of petitions
for increased wages, and improved conditions. The recipients disregarded the letters,
which became increasingly strident. Sixteen ships mutinied at Spithead on 16 April
1797. Fifteen ships at Plymouth joined the mutiny ten days later. The mutineers
expelled some officers, and refused to sail, but continued performing routine functions
while attempting to negotiate their working conditions. Admiral Lord Howe, a former
commander of the fleet, intervened in May and reached a peaceful settlement, which
included a royal pardon for the mutineers.17
Peace did not last. Mutinies at Portsmouth, Sheerness and Yarmouth followed
Spithead. The worst mutiny broke out at the Nore on 12 May 1797, aboard HMS
Sandwich. Several other ships quickly joined the mutiny. As had the Spithead mutineers,
3
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the mutineers at the Nore began by demanding modest changes to working conditions.
They, however, rejected the Spithead terms offered to them, and came to demand
radical political reform, including the dissolution of Parliament and the pursuit of peace
with France. The mutineers blockaded the ports of London. Eventually, the mutiny
collapsed, due largely to internal dissension. Eleven ships attempted to escape, after a
number had abandoned the mutiny in early June. All the mutineers had surrendered by
June 15.18
These combined mutinies were known “without exaggeration,” according to
Billy Budd’s narrator, as “the Great Mutiny.” (54) They were “great” not just because of
their size but also because the navy and the public feared, at one point, that mutineers
would sail a fleet of ships to France, changing the balance of power in the war. Later,
they feared the mutineers’ blockade of London would continue for a crippling period of
time, turning the Navy’s function in support of English commerce on its head. One
early chronicler of the mutinies vividly described their effect on the mood of the nation.
In the time between Spithead and the Nore, “the country was inundated by seditious
pamphlets” composed by “mischievous individual who sought to make the present
occasion an instrument to incite the whole kingdom into a flame of rebellion.” 19 While
the mutinies were ongoing, “the intense anxiety manifested by the whole nation
amounted almost to convulsion.”20
The events in Billy Budd take place in the summer of 1797 (54), only a few weeks
or months after the mutinies at Spithead and the Nore. The narrator of the novel says
“’the Great Mutiny’” was
a demonstration more menacing to England than the contemporary
manifestoes and conquering and proselyting armies of the French
Directory. To the British Empire the Nore Mutiny was what a strike in the
fire brigade would be to London threatened by general arson. . . .
Reasonable discontent growing out of practical grievances in the fleet had
been ignited into irrational combustion as by live cinders blow across the
Channel from France in flames. (54)21
Weisberg references the mutinies only in one aspect: the narrator’s description of
how historians in such matters abridge the truth by omitting details from an event that
challenges national pride. But he fails to engage the story’s most obvious and direct
relevance: The Great Mutiny’s vital context for evaluating Vere’s motives for the
summary execution of Budd. The historians’ reticence reflects the profound fear the
Great Mutiny engendered in British society.
4

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3280430

McAdams & Corré, New Light on Billy Budd
The narrator reports that the Nore insurrection was put down with difficulty,
thanks to the “unswerving loyalty of the marine corps.” (55). As a result of the mutinies,
some improvements were made, “[b]ut not every grievance was redressed.” (58). One
critical issue was “impressment.” Although England did not use conscription to supply
men for other military services, it used “the press” or the “press gang” to compel men
into naval service. Once in service, men rarely left their ships, which essentially
imprisoned them. Billy Budd recites in its first pages an apt allegory: Budd is impressed
from a merchant ship named The Rights of Man, to which he says: “And good-bye to you
too, old Rights-of-Man.” (49). All conscription is involuntary servitude, but naval service
involved hard and dangerous work for which even small infractions were punishable
by flogging. Impressment was therefore controversial, but the navy could not otherwise
obtain enough manpower to run its sailing ships, especially during war. “Its abrogation
would have crippled the indispensable fleet, one wholly under canvas, no steam
power.” (59).
For Budd’s story, the crucial point is that the problem was not fully settled, and
certainly not perceived to be fully settled, when the Nore mutinies ended in June. Just
as the Nore was the “unforeseen renewal of [the Spithead] insurrection on yet a larger
scale,” (55), there was no certainty that July or August would not bring a new and still
larger rebellion. Relevant too is the history just after the fictional events in Billy Budd. In
September of 1797, there was another mutiny on HMS Hermione, which is generally
understood to be the bloodiest in British naval history. Mutineers murdered the captain,
eight other officers, and two midshipmen. They sailed and delivered the ship to Spain.
Thus, Melville set Billy Budd right between the combined mutinies of Spithead and the
Nore and the worst individual mutiny of the Hermione. As the narrator says about the
timing of Budd’s slaying of Claggart: “That the unhappy event which has been narrated
could not have happened at a worse junction was but too true. For it was close on the heel of
the suppressed insurrections, an aftertime very critical to naval authority, demanding
from every English sea commander two qualities not readily interfusable – prudence
and rigor.” (102-03, emphasis added).
All of which forms the basic context for evaluating Vere’s fear that the failure to
execute Budd would risk mutiny. The captain of any British naval ship in the summer
of 1797 had to be alert to the danger of mutiny. The text makes this clear. The narrator
explains early on: “Discontent foreran the Two Mutinies, and more or less it lurkingly
survived them. Hence it was not unreasonable to apprehend some return of trouble
sporadic or general. . . . So it was that for a time, on more than one quarter-deck, anxiety
did exist. At sea, precautionary vigilance was strained against relapse.” (59). As an
example, during engagements, “the lieutenants assigned to batteries felt it incumbent
on them, in some instances, to stand with drawn swords behind the men working the
5
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guns.” (58). The point of this, one might infer, is to threaten to use the sword against the
men should they pick that chaotic time to turn on the officers.
Weisberg and his supporters claim that the narrative portrays no threat of
mutiny on the Bellipotent. West calls it a “likely nonexistent threat.”22 The historic
context suggests otherwise. Perhaps Weisberg and West misread the narrator, when he
states early in the story that, on that ship, “very little in the manner of the men and
nothing obvious in the demeanor of the officers would have suggested to an ordinary
observer that the Great Mutiny was a recent event.” (59-60). But note how carefully and
redundantly the statement is qualified: “very little” implies that something in the
manner of the men did suggest the recency of the Great Mutiny; “nothing obvious”
allows that something subtle in the officers’ demeanor did refer to it. And these
observations are, in any event, limited by the narrator to what an “ordinary observer”
would discern. Someone with greater experience, say “a sailor of distinction even in a
time prolific of renowned seamen,” like Vere, might well detect more. (60).
Moreover, the threat on the Bellipotent is not confined to the background
circumstances affecting the whole fleet. When Claggart first begins to accuse Billy Budd
to Vere, Claggart says that “at least one sailor aboard was a dangerous character in a
ship mustering some who not only had taken a guilty part in the late serious troubles,
but also who, like the man in question, had entered His Majesty’s service under another
form than enlistment.” (92) In other words, serving on the Bellipotent were (1)
participants in the recent mutinies and (2) impressed men. Presumably, in some cases,
both.
Claggart is about to lie about Budd, but this statement cannot be a lie because
Vere would know if it were, and it would be self-defeating to begin his accusations with
an obvious canard. Perhaps it seems impossible that there would be participants in the
prior mutinies aboard the Bellipotent, but many were in fact not executed and the
narrator had previously noted that mutineers later served with Nelson in his great
victories. (56). The British navy was so desperate for men during the Napoleonic Wars
that, the narrator reveals, some press gangs endeavored to meet their quotas by “drafts
culled direct from the jails,” (66), another reason for officers to worry about the
maintenance of discipline and order.
Claggart goes on to say that he felt a particular need to make his report “in view
of extraordinary outbreaks so recent as those which, sorrowfully said, it needed not to
name.” When he comes close to naming a ship whose captain was taken hostage for a
time, Vere cuts him off, for he deemed it imprudent “for a petty officer unnecessarily to
allude to them.” (93). Why would Vere expect officers to avoid mentioning the specifics
6
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of the “late serious troubles” were there not a concern that even their mention, if
overheard, might signal to the crew that the officers were afraid?
Vere’s argument for the summary trial and execution of Budd cannot be
evaluated without attending to this context. First, the narrator explains Vere’s
reasoning: “Feeling that unless quick action was taken on it, the deed of the foretopman,
so soon as it should be known on the gun decks, would tend to awaken any slumbering
embers of the Nore among the crew, a sense of the urgency of the case overruled in
Vere every other consideration.” (104). Second, Vere argues to the officers of the
drumhead court:
[C]onsider the consequences of such clemency. The people” (meaning the
ship’s company) “have native sense; most of them are familiar with our
naval usage and tradition; and how would they take it? Even could you
explain to them – which our official position forbids – they, long molded
by arbitrary discipline, have not that kind of intelligent responsiveness
that might qualify them to comprehend and discriminate. No, to the
people the foretopman’s deed, however it be worded in the
announcement, will be plain homicide committed in a flagrant act of
mutiny. What penalty for that should follow, they know. But it does not
follow. Why? They will ruminate. You know what sailors are. Will they
not revert to the recent outbreak at the Nore? Ay. They know the wellfounded alarm – the panic it struck throughout England. Your clement
sentence they would account pusillanimous. They would think that we
flinch, that we are afraid of them – afraid of practicing a lawful rigor
singularly demanded at this junction less it should provoke new troubles.
What shame to us such a conjecture on their part, and how deadly to
discipline. You see then, whither, prompted by duty and the law, I
steadfastly drive. (112-13).
Whether ultimately correct or not, this argument makes even more sense when
one considers that Claggart was the ship’s master-at-arms, which was “a sort of
chief of police charged with . . . the duty of preserving order on the populous
lower gun decks.” (64). His killing posed a particular threat to that order.
Vere’s consequentialist argument turns out to be a critical part of his case.
The narrator explains that officers of the drumhead court placed the greatest
importance on “the practical consequences to discipline, considering the
unconfirmed tone of the fleet at the time, should a man-of-war’s man’s violent
killing at sea of a superior in grade be allowed to pass for aught else than a
7
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capital crime demanding prompt infliction of the penalty.” (113). Here, the
narrator refers to the summary execution of mutineers on the Somers, a matter
discussed below, and says “the urgency felt, well-warranted or otherwise, was
much the same.” (114).
Consider one final point. Weisberg argues that there was no real fear of
mutiny because the crew loved Budd and hated Claggart, and would have
applauded the captain if he showed Budd leniency. Yet that argument appeals
more to a modern liberal sensibility than to the norms of eighteenth century
British naval officers. There is nothing peculiar in Vere, in his day, expecting that
the maintenance of order among impressed men depended more on fear than on
love. Vere’s path pursued the former. His reasoning reflects the common sense
about the Great Mutiny, which was that the government’s leniency in
negotiating an end to the Spithead mutiny setting a course toward the Nore.
We do not believe that Weisberg gives a fair accounting of the argument just
described because he neglects the historic context of the Great Mutiny, as well as the
presence of impressed men and mutineers on the Bellipotent. Others have made a
persuasive case, we think, against Weisberg’s claim that Vere killed Budd out of envy at
his being a “Handsome Sailor” like Nelson and unlike Vere.23 We will not revisit that
debate. But the greater strength of the claim for military necessity, casts additional
doubt on Weisberg’s more personal and psychological interpretation.
To be clear, we do not defend the case for military necessity because we think it
is necessarily correct. We believe the text provides reason to support the contrary view
as well. The other officers of the Bellipotent think it would be safe and sufficient to
detain Billy Budd and refer the matter to the admiral for a court-martial after the ship
returns to the fleet. There is reason to doubt the sanity of Vere’s decision, as well as its
prudence. We are told that other officers, at some future point, criticized Vere’s decision
to keep the entire matter from the rest of the ship until the drumhead court had issued
its sentence. (103). Presumably, one alternative would have been to announce that Budd
was being held for a capital crime, with the possibility of deciding later to proceed
summarily only if discipline appeared to be under threat. As we explain in further
detail below, we believe the novel raises this debate – parallel to a real one about the
Somers – without resolving it.
The Law Outside the Narrative
If we are to evaluate Vere using law, the most suitable source of law is the novel
itself. We do not object to using sources outside the novel to assess prevailing legal
8
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standards, as Weisberg does. But one must be wary of external authority. We agree with
Weisberg that Melville was legally sophisticated and probably knew the background
law, but we doubt Melville would have assumed his audience to share his
sophistication. So, the most relevant source of the legal knowledge necessary to
interpret Billy Budd is the law related within the confines of the narrative.
In any event, nothing in Weisberg’s legal sources answers the relevant questions.
The printed sources on which he relies yield only a limited and abstract understanding
of how the system of naval discipline in England actually worked at the end of the
eighteenth century. This is because all of those sources are formal, “legislative” in
nature. As any legal realist would say, it is important to identify and understand how
these rules worked in practice.
The specific foundation of the law of naval discipline in 1797 was a statute that
Parliament passed in 1749, commonly called the Naval Act.24 Part II of the Naval Act
lists the Articles of War, 36 consecutively enumerated paragraphs identifying
substantive offenses against naval discipline. Each Article of War provides a
punishment, ranging from dismissal, to the imposition of a sentence, sometimes
expressly including death, deemed fit by a court-martial, to mandatory sentences of
death. The 22nd Article of War is most pertinent to the case of Billy Budd. It subjects to a
mandatory death sentence any person who strikes or draws a weapon on a superior
officer “being in the execution of his office, on any Pretence whatsoever.”25 The Naval
Act also sets out the procedural rules governing a court-martial. Nineteen of the 25
parts of the Naval Act fall into this category. These provisions provide great detail
about the rules governing the initiation and composition of a court-martial, the form of
indictment and other documentation, and trial.26
But the Naval Act does not set forth the circumstances that mandate the
convening of a court-martial. The written rules define what procedures a court-martial
requires, but do not state when a court-martial is required. It is obvious that a courtmartial is not always required for naval discipline, given that those procedures involve
substantial delay and the involvement of an admiral and other ship captains. The
eighteenth-century navy could not run if any iota of misbehavior by a member of a ship
required the convening and completion of a court-martial before the captain could
administer any form of discipline. Running any military organization requires the
power to administer summary discipline. England’s navy of 1797, especially with its
large contingent of impressed crewmen, was no exception.27
Weisberg does not contest this point. He concedes that discipline occurred
outside the parameters of formal courts-martial. His only response is to cite printed
9
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material suggesting a strict limit on the captain’s summary power. The author of a
comprehensive treatise on contemporary martial law wrote that “[a] captain or
commander of any of his majesty’s ships or vessels, has the power of inflicting
punishment on a seaman in a summary manner for any faults or offense committed,
contrary to the rules of obedience established in the navy.”28 But while the passage
extolled the administrative and deterrent advantages of granting the captain some
summary power to punish crew members, it ended with a qualification on which
Weisberg relies: “By the 4th article of the Old Printed Instructions, a captain was not
authorized to punish a seaman beyond 12 lashes on his bare back, with a cat-of-ninetails; but, if the fault should deserve a greater punishment, he was directed to apply for
a court-martial.”29
This is very weak evidence. The “Old Printed Instructions” were set forth in
Principles of good Government to be observed on board His Majesty’s Ships of War, a collection
of documents that had existed since at least 1734, and which referred to instructions
established “by his majesty in council.”30 The Old Printed Instructions were thus issued
by the king sitting in his Privy Council after the establishment of Parliamentary
Supremacy, and yet had no Parliamentary mandate. We are as yet unaware of any
authority that would have bound the Admiralty in general, or any ship’s captain in
particular, to their terms. Moreover, in other work, we report on an extensive review of
British captain’s logs maintained in the United Kingdom National Archives. Rather
than initiating court-martial proceedings, captains routinely ordered the summary
administration of more than twelve lashes to punish a whole host of offenses. When
Vere convened a drumhead court on the Bellipotent, the Old Printed Instructions had
little or no operational effect on the practice of naval discipline.31
If one is to seek a prevailing standard outside the text of Billy Budd, we think the
more accurate statement of the extraordinary martial power of British naval captains
comes from the mid-nineteenth-century author, William Johnson Neale, who stated:
The captain of a man-of-war is, for the time being, as despotic a sovereign
as can easily be imagined: he certainly has not ventured often to take the
lives of his fellow subjects without any trial, though instances even of this
have not been wanting; but for every inferior punishment, with the
exception of flogging round the fleet, he is at once both judge and jury -witness and prosecutor, if he pleases.32
As an example that “instances even of this have not been wanting,” Neale related the
case of an unnamed captain who heard of a crew member complaining twice about the
10
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quality of the ship’s wine. After a cursory investigation, the captain determined on his
own that the complaint was an attempt to foster discord and the complainant was
therefore a mutineer, whereupon the captain drew his sword and killed him. The
captain was never court-martialed and ultimately received a peerage.33 In sum, the law
outside the narrative does not support the claim that Vere acted contrary to legal
practice in 1797.
The Narrator’s View of the Law
So we return to the law and custom related within the narrative. Vere’s own
statements of the law vindicate his decision, but we agree with Weisberg that we must
consider the possibility of his being biased. Intentionally or unintentionally, Vere might
be misleading the drumhead tribunal. Weisberg, however, overlooks the source of law
and custom within the narrative that provides our entire knowledge of the story: the
narrator, never identified, but one whose “inside narrative” suggests he was on board
the Bellipotent as the events unfolded. The narrator says just enough to make Weisberg’s
legal analysis untenable.
The source of all the procedural objections that Weisberg raises to Vere’s conduct
is Vere’s decision to bypass a court-martial in favor of a summary proceeding. The
printed materials do not mention summary procedure, which leads Weisberg to claim
that Vere invented it. Yet the narrator suggests otherwise several times. The narrator, not
Vere, tells the reader that “it would not be at variance with usage to turn the matter
over to a summary court of [Vere’s] own officers . . . . Accordingly a drumhead court
was summarily convened.” (104). After Vere’s long argument for conviction and
execution, we return to the narrator who states the result:
In brief, Billy Budd was formally convicted and sentenced to be hung at
the yardarm in the early morning watch, it being now night. Otherwise, as
is customary in such cases, the sentence would forthwith have been carried
out. In wartime on the field or in the fleet, a mortal punishment decreed by a
drumhead court – on the field sometimes decreed by but a nod from the
general – follows without delay on the heel of conviction, without appeal. (114,
emphasis added)
Finally, the narrator explains: “Now each proceeding that follows a mortal sentence
pronounced at sea by a drumhead court is characterized by promptitude not
perceptibly merging into a hurry, though bordering that.” (126)

11
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One might counter these statements by noting that other officers of the Bellipotent
alluded to a practice of delaying action until the ship rejoined the squadron, thus
permitting a formal court-martial. The surgeon thought Vere should place Budd in
confinement “in a way dictated by usage” and, after rejoining the squadron, refer the
matter to the admiral. The other officers agreed. (101). But note that the surgeon
thought that Vere’s actions were “impolitic,” not illegal or unprecedented. No one
contradicts either the narrator’s characterization that “it would not be at variance with
usage to turn the matter over to a summary court of [Vere’s] own officers,” or the
custom immediately executing those condemned by a drumhead court.
Perhaps the narrator’s description of naval usage and custom is incorrect. Yet,
even if Vere’s legal claims are unreliable, it is hard to imagine that Melville would offer
the reader no accurate description of the law. How would the ordinary reader
apprehend that Vere had acted unlawfully? How can the only reliable source of the law
for evaluating the narrative come from the kind of legal research Weisberg does? In any
event, Weisberg does not actually set out to prove the narrator wrong. The printed legal
materials Weisberg uses do not purport to address naval custom and practice. Of course,
one might argue that, if this practice existed, it was illegal. But one cannot prove this
merely by observing that the rule omits the practice. In the nation that created the
common law, if a statute does not purport to abrogate a custom, the customary practice
presumably persists alongside the statutory innovation. Weisberg’s criticism of Vere is
less compelling if naval captains at the time generally understood themselves to have
the authority to bypass court-martial procedures and carry out summary executions,
and occasionally did so without censure. The narrator suggests exactly that.
The primary point, however, is that the reader has no reason to second-guess the
narrator’s view of the legal practice and the naval custom. Weisberg suggests that the
story is one where Vere is a villain, but one can only learn that by leaving the text and
conducting external legal research.
The Law Revealed in the Case of the Somers
Another way to evaluate Vere within the novel is to consider the affair of the
USS Somers as related by the narrator. Although the Somers was an American naval
ship, and the parallel events occurred almost a half-century after the fictional hanging
of Billy Budd, the Somers case would have likely been familiar to readers when Melville
wrote, more familiar than any source of English naval law. In this section, we refer to
some material about the Somers that is outside the narrative, albeit only to reinforce the
significance of what is in the text.
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The novel compels the reader to connect Budd’s case and the Somers. The
narrator explains the emotions of the members of the drumhead court as follows:
Not unlikely they were brought to something more or less akin to that
harassed frame of mind which in the year 1842 actuated the commander
of the U.S. brig-of-war Somers to resolve, under the so-called Articles of
War, Articles modeled upon the English Mutiny Act, to resolve upon the
execution at sea of a midshipman and two sailors as mutineers designing
the seizure of the brig. Which resolution was carried out though in a time
of peace and within not many days’ sail of home. An act vindicated by a
naval court of inquiry subsequently convened ashore. History, and here cited
without comment. True, the circumstances on board the Somers were
different from those on board the Bellipotent. But the urgency felt, wellwarranted or otherwise, was much the same. (113-14, emphasis added)
As explained below, a contemporary reader could easily have been
familiar with some basic background: the Somers’ First Lieutenant, Guert
Gansevoort, reported to the Captain, Alexander Slidell Mackenzie, a mutiny plot
with three ringleaders, but possibly involving others. One of the ringleaders,
Philip Spencer, was the son of Secretary of War, John Spencer. Even after
Mackenzie arrested the ringleaders and placed them in irons, he judged the
situation on the small ship to be dangerous because of undetected coconspirators among the crew. His officers concurring, Mackenzie ordered the
immediate hanging of the ringleaders, and their burial at sea. Upon return to
New York, a naval court of inquiry exonerated Mackenzie and the officers
involved. Mackenzie nevertheless requested a court-martial, a common way for
an officer to clear his name, which also acquitted Mackenzie and the officers.
The Somers case became a focal point of public controversy, attracting
critics and defenders of Mackenzie.34 Mackenzie was already known to the
public, as the author of several books detailing personal and historical naval
adventures.35 Unsurprisingly, Secretary Spencer argued vehemently that the
execution of his son was unjustified, doubting both the existence of a mutiny plot
and the need for summary procedures.36 James Fennimore Cooper (who had
once argued in print with Mackenzie about a matter of naval history) came to
hold a very critical view of Mackenzie’s actions, and ultimately published an
annotated version of the naval proceedings in the case.37
Other literary and legal notables sided with Mackenzie: Richard Henry
Dana, Jr., a Harvard-trained lawyer who spent time as a merchant seaman and
13
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wrote Two Years Before the Mast; Francis Leiber, an academic lawyer who went on
to write a comprehensive code of the laws of war; Henry Wadsworth
Longfellow, who knew Mackenzie before the event; and Charles Sumner, the
lawyer and prominent abolitionist of Massachusetts, who served as Senator from
1861 to 1871.38 Sumner penned a vigorous defense of Mackenzie, and reported
elsewhere that Justice Joseph Story also maintained that Mackenzie had acted
appropriately.39 In the end, the failings of Richard Spencer caused many to fear
for the moral character of the younger generation, which contributed to the
creation of the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis.40
Melville was aware of the controversy, which occurred while he was at sea on a
merchant ship. Gansevoort, the lieutenant who first reported the mutiny plot to
Mackenzie, was his cousin, whom he had known since childhood. Moreover, the case of
the Somers was revived in the public imagination around the time that Melville was
writing Billy Budd, as several national magazines featured retrospective articles on the
subject. Many defended Mackenzie, but one was provocatively titled “The Murder of
Richard Spencer.”41
None of this means that Melville sided with his cousin. Indeed, in his 1850 novel,
White Jacket, Melville criticizes the naval use of the death penalty and a captain’s
unconstrained power to punish the crew. After quoting several of the Articles of War
that end with the phrase “he shall suffer death,” Melville refers to the Somers in the
following passages:
What happened to those three sailors on board an American armed vessel
a few years ago, quite within your memory, White Jacket . . . . ‘Shall suffer
death!’ those were the three words than hung those three sailors. . . . By the
mainmast! Then, in a time of profound peace, I am subject to the cutthroat martial law!42
And later:
The well-known case of a United States brig furnishes a memorable
example, which at any moment may be repeated. Three men, in a time of
peace, were then hung at the yard-arm, merely because, in the captain’s
judgment, it became necessary to hang them. To this day the question of
their complete guilt is socially discussed.
How shall we characterize such a deed? Says Blackstone, ‘If anyone that
hath commission of a martial authority doth, in time of peace, hang, or
14
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otherwise execute any man by colour of martial law, this is murder; for it
is against Magna Charta.’43
It is not clear that the narrator in White Jacket, or Melville, thought that Mackenzie
and Gansevoort were technically guilty of murder, but the argument against the
excessive use of naval authority and discipline does reflect Melville’s view.
Therefore, we are justified in thinking that the Somers case is useful for
interpreting the events in Billy Budd. As a legal matter, the first point is simple
and powerful, yet neglected by Weisberg: The Somers case is a precedent in favor
of Vere. As described within the narrative: “An act vindicated by a naval court of
inquiry subsequently convened ashore.” (114). We can add that the court-martial
affirmed the court of inquiry. Both found in favor of the captain’s power to
bypass formal procedures and to conduct a summary trial and execution. As far
as we have been able to determine, no written procedure in the American
Articles of War explicitly authorized this summary justice, and yet the ruling
recognized that the captain’s general powers in an emergency, when the safety of
the ship was at stake, were not limited to the explicitly codified powers.
Note also the factual parallels. Both the Somers and the Bellipotent, the
threat offered to justify summary procedures was not fear of the person
executed, but a fear of what the rest of the crew might do. On the Somers, the
ringleaders were incapacitated by their irons and presented no risk to justify
immediate execution, but officers speculated, that circumstances might
precipitate mutiny by other members of the crew, partly out of a desire to free
the prisoners. On the Bellipotent, Vere did not fear Billy Budd, but he feared
mutiny from other members of the crew if he did not execute Budd. So the
example of the Somers is particularly helpful to Vere.
Significantly too, in the Somers case both on-shore inquiries deferred to the
captain’s judgment with respect to contested factual matters. Critics of Vere
claim there was insufficient evidence of possible mutiny on the Bellipotent,
notwithstanding the Great Mutiny and other circumstances discussed above. Yet,
the same complaint existed for the Somers. After the fact, there were alternative
views of Philip Spencer’s conduct, some crediting his claim that his talk of taking
over the ship was just a private joke.44 And even if Spencer was serious, many
claimed that there was no clear evidence of a mutiny danger (charges against the
other crew members were ultimately dropped) and no reason to proceed
summarily.45 Ultimately, however, Mackenzie’s judges deferred to his best
judgment, which he had exercised during a crisis to maintain control of his ship.
15
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In some ways, Vere is on stronger ground than Mackenzie was. The
Somers affair occurred in peacetime. White Jacket focused on this point – absent
war, why was it necessary for the captain to wield such martial authority? But
Budd was executed in a hot moment of the Napoleonic wars,46 right after the
Great Mutiny. The officers of the Somers had no American parallel to the Great
Mutiny. Moreover, Budd has struck and killed a superior officer, which, however
accidental or provoked, was an astonishing criminal act, “the most heinous of
military crimes,” punishable by death (103).47 The Somers mutineers were
condemned merely for what they said and supposedly planned.
None of this means, that the Somers case resolves all normative issues in
Vere’s favor. First, one might think, as many did, apparently including the young
Melville, that the Somers case was wrongly decided. Second, one might conclude
that Mackenzie had more justification than did Vere. Most obviously, none of
Vere’s officers agreed with him, many advocating detention and formal courtmartial. All of Mackenzie’s officers supported him. Also, given that the fear
justifying immediate execution was mutiny, it matters that Vere did not believe
Budd himself posed any threat of mutiny. The condemned men on the Somers,
though incapacitated, were the source of the mutiny concern.
Offsetting this last distinction, it bears mentioning that Budd was not wholly
innocent in that regard. Budd knew but did not tell Vere that another impressed man
had said that he and others were talking of mutiny. We think this man was an agent
provocateur sent by Claggart, but Budd did not know that. As the narrator says: “It never
entered [Budd’s] mind that, from its extreme questionableness, it was his duty as a loyal
bluejacket to report in the proper quarter.” (85) And later: “[I]t was incumbent on him,
and failure so to do, if charged against him and proven, would have subjected him to
the heaviest of penalties.” (106-07). The 20th Article of War in the Naval Act made it a
crime punishable by death to “conceal any traitorous or mutinous Practice or Design.”48
Perhaps this is all irrelevant to the proper evaluation of Vere’s actions because Vere did
not know what Budd had witnessed (because Claggart died before he could inform
Vere). But the narrator’s observation is one more reminder of Melville’s design to make
the case a hard one.
All of this is grist for the mill and consistent with our view of Billy Budd: It
is best understood as neither clearly vindicating nor clearly condemning Vere.
Instead, it poses, without purporting to resolve, a vexing and provocative
problem. The case against Vere is not that he pretended to fear a mutiny so he
could satisfy his murderous envy of Budd. The case against Vere is that he was
16
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wrong, that the speculative danger of mutiny was insufficient to justify summary
execution. A formal court-martial might have recommended Budd for mercy,
given the extenuating circumstances of his case. The novel shows how much
power was vested in the captain. And even a captain acting in good faith, may,
by bad judgment, do something lawful but terribly wrong.
* * * * *
The setting of the novel right after The Great Mutiny, the narrator’s views of
naval law and custom, and the Somers case all cast considerable doubt on Weisberg’s
evaluation of Vere. Ultimately, Weisberg’s argument depends, as do many legal
arguments, on shifting the burden of proof. The Articles of War do not explicitly
authorize a captain to bypass formal courts-martial in favor of summary proceedings.
But neither do they make formal court-martial the exclusive procedure by which a
captain may try and punish a capital crime. If not expressly repudiated by formal law,
customary practice presumably survives. Vere’s actions were consistent with the
customs described without contradiction by a reliable narrator. Perhaps he was unwise
or morally wrong to do so – a subject for endless and revealing debate – but under the
most faithful reading of the text, Captain Edward Vere did not murder Billy Budd.
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